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Powers of Appointment and the
Kentucky Inheritance Tax-
The Department of Revenues
Administration of KRS
Section 140.040
By WnLM P. STURM*
I~NTODUCTION
Powers of appointment' are becoming increasingly popular
today2 largely because they extend the decedents control over his
property3 and help minimize death taxes. Most states tax
property passing at death under powers of appointment.5 States
often have a hard time, however, formulating a statutory provision
to meet their needs. Those that are on the statute books are often
* Attorney, Legal Staff, Kentucky Department of Revenue; A.B. 1966, Univer-
sity of Kentucky; J.D. 1971, Vanderbilt University.
' A power of appointment is a power or authority conferred by one person
called the donor upon another person called the donee to appoint, that is, to select
and nominate, the person or persons called the appointees or beneficiaries who are
to receive and enjoy an estate or an income therefrom or from a fund after the
donee's death or after the termination of an existing right or interest. BLAcE's LAW
DICTIONARY 1334 (4th ed. 1951). A donee's power of appointment is said to be
"general" if the donee may appoint the property to anyone he chooses or to a
limited group which includes himself, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of
his estate. If the donee is precluded by the power from appointment to himself,
his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate, he holds a "special" power
of appointment. Kentucky does not distinguish between general and special powers
of appointment in levying inheritance taxes. The federal government does, how-
ever and taxes property subject to a general power twice (once when transferred
to tihe donee and again when transferred from donee to beneficiary), and
property subject to a special power once. KENTUCKY LEGISLATVE RESEARCH COM-
MISSION, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXATION 14 (1961).
2 3 R. PowE-x, REAL PROPERTY f1 385, at 337 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
POWELL].
a RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note 1808-09 (1940).
4 POWELL, supra note 2, 11 385, at 336-37.
5 All states, with the exception of Nevada, have inheritance or estate tax
statutes. Of these, only Connecticut, Indiana, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Utah,
and Louisiana have no specific provision for the taxation of powers of appointment.
Louisiana, a civil law state does not recognize powers of appointment. 4 CCH
INH. EST. & Gnr TAX REP. [State Compilation] II 1540C, at 80, 164-65 (1968).
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complex and misunderstood by the average lawyer. The situation
in Kentucky is no exception. From the inception of inheritance
taxes in 19060 and the first statute specifically relating to powers
of appointment in 1924,1 there have been conflicts over the con-
stitutionality and interpretation of Kentucky Revised Statutes §
140.040 [hereinafter cited as KRS] which have not ceased to this
day,8 even among legal scholars.9 It is submitted that a thorough
knowledge of the Department of Revenue's administration of
KRS § 140.040 is a prerequisite to further analysis and research
in this area of the law. Unfortunately, such information has
been previously unavailable in printed form, and much confusion
has been caused by legal writers trying to state the Department's
interpretation and at the same time formulate their own views.
The intent of this article, therefore, is not to criticize or suggest
reform of the statute but to provide a straightforward presentation
of the Department of Revenue's interpretation and administration
of KRS § 140.040.10 It is hoped that this presentation will be
helpful both to lawyers in their everyday practice and to academi-
cians in the further investigation of powers of appointment.
I. STATE TAXATION OF Pow RS OF APPOINTMNT GENERALLY
Kentucky levies an inheritance tax and, in a few cases, an
estate tax. 1 An inheritance tax is imposed on the privilege of
6Ky. AcTs ch. 22, art. XIX (1906). In 1936 the act was renumbered § 4281a
of CARROLL'S KENTUCKY STATUTES. In 1942, at the time of the general revision,
it was redesignated Chapter 140 of the KENTUCKY REVisED STATUTES [hereinaftercited as KRS].7cKy. ACTS ch. 111, § 1(3) (1924), redesignated § 4281a-14 of CARROu.'S
KENTUCKY STATUTES in 1936 and § 140.040 of KRS in 1942.8 See Kentucky Bd. of Tax Appeals v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,
File Nos. F-198-72, F-205-72 (Ky., sled Sept. 26, 1973).
9 For general authority on powers of appointment in Kentucky, see KENTUCKY
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMISSION, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXATION 13-15
(1961); DEP'T OF REVENUE, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TxE.S iN KENTucKY 36,
42-44 (Special Report No. 6, 1947); Sullivan, Appellate Court Interpreta-
tion of Kentucky Inheritance Tax Statutes, 85 Ky. L.J. 198, 202-04 (1947);
Note, Kentucky Death Taxes-Putting a Price on Inheritance, 58 Ky. L.J. 549,
563-68 (1970). The author is hesitant to cite authorities because articles on Ken-
tucky powers of appointment are often confusing and misleading. The latter note
presents the most extensive treatment of powers of appointment but also differs
extensively from the Department of Revenue's interpretation and administration of
KRS § 140.040.
1o Although prepared with the full cooperation of the Department of Revenue's
Legal Staff and Inheritance Tax Section, this article is not an official publication
of the Department.
11The inheritance tax provisions of KRS § 140.010 et seq. apply in the vast
majority of cases. Under KRS § 140.065 an estate tax is levied only on estates of
$3,000,000 or more.
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receiving inherited property and falls on the beneficiary,' al-
though most states require the executor or the administrator of
the decedent's estate to collect it. 13 An estate tax, on the other
hand, taxes the privilege of transmitting property at death and is
paid by the decedent's estate. 4
Generally it is the exercise of the power of appointment by
the donee which is the taxable event.'5 For tax valuation purposes,
the property subject to the power passing to the donee at the
donor's death is composed of two elements, the donee's life estate
and the appointee's remainder interest. If the donee has no power
to encroach upon the appointive property itself, the value of the
donee's life estate gradually decreases as he advances in age with
a corresponding increase in the value of the remainder interest.
At the donee's death, his life estate will have a zero value and the
remainder interest will equal the total value of the appointive
property. Although closely tied to a power of appointment, the
donee's life estate does not pass pursuant to the exercise of the
power and is not taxable as such. The donee's life estate is gen-
erally taxed at the donor's death by the donor's state of resi-
dence. 16
Great confusion has reigned involving the taxation of powers
of appointment. Part of this confusion results from the fact that
the common law rule provides that property passing under a
power of appointment is deemed to pass directly from the donor
to the beneficiary;' 7 the donee is only considered to be the instru-
ment the donor uses to carry out his wishes.' 8 This is the Ken-
tucky rule as well.'9 The common law rule, however, ignores
reality since it is the donee who actually decides who is to finally
possess or own the appointive property, and not the donor.
20
12 Martin v. Storrs, 126 S.W.2d 445 (Ky. 1939).
:3 E.g., KRS § 140.220.
14 Cearhart's Ex'r v. Howard, 196 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1946).
15 Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Bassett, 253 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Ky. 1952). But
see Allen's Exr v. Howard, 200 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Ky. 1947) where the death of
the donor is referred to as the taxable event.
16E.g., KRS § 140.040(2).
17 Highfield v. Delaware Trust Co., 152 A. 124 (Del. 1930); In re Higgins
Estate, 189 N.W. 752 (Iowa 1922); PowEr. supra note 2, II 387, at 347-52.
18 Bankers Trust Co. v. Variell, 123 A.2d 874 (Conn. 1956); ~s-rATEmr oF
PRoPERTr, Introductory Note 1811 (1940).
19 Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Bassett, 253 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1952). Ream v.
Dep't of Revenue, 236 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1951); Commonwealth v. Fidefity & Co-
lumbia Trust Co., 146 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1940).2 o Commonwealth v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 146 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1940).
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When inheritance taxes were first levied, the statutes were
often general in nature and did not deal specifically with powers
of appointment.21 Under such a statute, appointive property was
taxed wholly in the donor's, not the donee's, estate because the
donee never had title and at common law appointive property
is a transfer from the donor.22 Subsequently, states began to
clarify and enlarge their inheritance tax statutes, often enacting
sections specifically taxing powers of appointment.
Some states originally taxed the exercise of the power of
appointment at the donee's death.23 These states changed the
common law rule by providing that the appointive property was
taxable "as if it belonged absolutely to the donee."24 Those states
taxing donees, as Kentucky did before 1936, soon learned that
they were losing revenue rightfully considered to be theirs when
resident donors gave powers of appointment either to nonresident
donees or resident donees who subsequently moved out of the
state.25 This was true even though the resident donor had enjoyed
all the privileges of residency. On the other hand, states which
first levied the tax at the donor's death soon discovered that there
were many outstanding powers of appointment created by donors
dying prior to the effective date of their acts.26 The resident
donees were being afforded the same privileges as resident donors
and the taxing states felt these donees should bear their fair
share of the tax burden. These states, then, had to amend their
tax statutes to correct what was considered to be an inequality
in the law. It was hard, however, for most states to formulate a
clear, concise, and non-discriminatory law which would enable
the tax to be collected at the death of all resident donors
dying after the effective date of the act and, in all other cases, at
the donee's death. Once a state decided to change its tax policy
21 E.g., Ky. Aars ch. 22, art. XIX (1906); MASS. AcTs ch. 563 (1907).
22 4 CCH INH. EST. & GIFT TAx REP. [State Compilation] ff 1540C, at 80, 164
(196 23 E.g., N.Y. LAws ch. 284, § 220(6) (1897).
2 4 POWELL II 392, at 377-78 & n.5; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 833, at 1880
(194Reiam v. Dep't of Revenue 236 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Ky. 1951).26 E.g., MASS. Aers ch. 563 (1907).
27 Maystates do not try to tax all powers of appointmnent as Kentucky does,
but find it simpler to levy the tax only at the donor s or donee's death. Missouri,
New Jersey, and Tennessee, for example, tax appointive property only at the resident
donor's death, while Texas, South Dakota, and Washigton are examples of states
levying the tax at the donee's death.
1973]
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and shift the incidence of the tax from the donee to the donor, or
vice-versa, there was a question of constitutionality. Case law
indicates that a state may change its tax policy in this area.28
A bigger problem was that of classification and equal treat-
ment of donors and donees. Here discrimination existed be-
cause of hastily and poorly drafted statutes. For this rea-
son, some state statutes, notably that of Massachusetts, were
struck down.29 Other states, including Kentucky, found their
statutes to be ambiguous or to contain discriminatory omissions
which had to be clarified by the state legislatures.3 0
II. TuE HISTORY OF THE PowERs or APIonIvImENT
STATUTE ] KENTUCKy s l
A. The 1924 Act
Kentucky passed its first inheritance tax law in 1906.32 This
act, however, had no provision dealing with powers of appoint-
ment. The Inheritance Tax Act of 192433 was the first to deal
with powers of appointment and provided that:
Whenever any person shall exercise a power of appointment
derived from any disposition of property, made, whether be-
fore or after the passage of this act, such appointment when
made shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the provisions
of this act in the same manner as though the property to which
such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of
such power and has been bequeathed or devised by such
donee by will; and whenever any person possessing such a
power of appointment so derived shall omit or fail to exercise
the same within the time provided therefor in whole or in
part, a transfer taxable under the provisions of this act shall
be deemed to take place to the extent of such omission or
failure, in the same manner as though the person thereby
28 E.g., Whitney v. State Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 530 (1940); Binney v. Long,
299 U.S. 280 (1936); Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 169 S.W.2d 621
(Ky. 1943).
29 MAss. AcTs ch. 527, § 8 (1909); Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936).
30 E.g., KRS § 140.040; Cal. Inh. Tax Act of 1921, § 2(6) (as amended 1929);
N.Y. LAws ch. 710, art. 10(c) (1930).
31 Parts A through C of this section as edited by the author, were taken from
several old Department of Revenue briefs.
32 Ky. Acs ch. 22, art. XIX (1906). This act now forms the basis of KRS §
140.010.33Ky. AcTs ch. 111, § 3(1) (1924).
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becoming entitled to the possession or enjoyment of the prop-
erty to which such power related had succeeded thereto by
will of the donee of the power failing to exercise such power,
taking effect at the time of such omission or failure.
The 1924 Act was first construed in Commonwealth v. Fidelity
& Columbia Trust Co.34 This case concerned the taxability of
certain property transferred pursuant to a power of appointment
created in 1896 at the death of the donor, a resident of Kentucky.
The donee, also a resident of Kentucky, died in 1936. The Depart-
ment of Revenue assessed the inheritance tax, at the death of the
donee, against that part of the property received by the bene-
ficiaries under the appointment. Since the donor of the power
died before the enactment of the statute, there could, of course,
be no tax against property passing under his will. In sustaining
the Department's assessment, the Court reiterated the common
law rule that a donee's exercise of a power of appointment is a
disposition of the donor's property. It was pointed out, however,
that for purposes of taxation the estate appointed by the donee
should be considered as if it were the property of the donee and
that if the donee failed to exercise the power, the statute took
effect as if the donee owned the property in fee.
B. The 1986 Act
In administering the 1924 Act, the Department apparently
encountered certain administrative difficulties in collecting the
tax. As noted above, under the 1924 Act the tax attached at the
death of the donee. Thus, if after the death of the donor, the
donee moved out of Kentucky or was a nonresident, certain trans-
fers would escape taxation completely. In an attempt to remedy
this situation, the Legislature amended the 1924 Act in 193635
by adding the following provision:
Provided that in the case of such power of appointment, the
transfer shall be deemed to take place, for the purpose of
taxation, at the time of the death of the donor and the assess-
ment be made at that time against the life interest of the
donee and the remainder against the corpus and collection
34146 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1940).
35Ky. AcTs ch. 8,§ 1(8) (Spec. Sess. 1936).
19731
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therefor shall be made pursuant to section eight (8) sub-
section five (5).
The Court of Appeals considered the 1936 Act in the case of
Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co.3 The donor of the
power of appointment died in 1929. The donee died in 1939
without having exercised the power. At the death of the donee,
the Department assessed inheritance tax against the property
subject to the power and applied the rate fixed by the 1936 Act.
The taxpayers objected to the assessment on the ground that the
property should have been taxed under the proviso of the 1936
statute and that the lower rates in effect at the time of the donor's
death in 1929 should have been applied. The Department con-
tended that the words "created after the effective date of this act"
should be interpolated into the proviso as follows:
Provided that in the case of such power of appointment
[created after the effective date of this act], the transfer shall
be deemed to take place, for the purpose of taxation, at the
time of the death of the donor and the assessment be made at
that time against the life interest of the donee and the re-
mainder against the corpus .... 3
According to the Department, its assessment at the date of the
donee's death at 1936 rates was valid since the power had been
created before April 24, 1936, the effective date of the Act. In
other words, it argued that the proviso, which levied the tax at
the death of the donor, applied only to powers created after April
24, 1936. With respect to the proviso the Court said:
... [T]he primary purpose of the proviso was to enable the
Commission to assess promptly and collect taxes on deferred
interest, relieving it of much bookkeeping, necessity of in-
cessantly keeping track of interests of remaindermen, and to
collect taxes which might be lost by removals from the juris-
diction, failures to report, etc. The plan, which allows less
chance of escape from taxation, seems to be patterned after
the New York plan .... 8
The Court found the statute conflicting because the first
36 169 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1948).
37 Id. at 622.
38 Id.
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portion of the section authorized taxation at one time (the death
of the donee) and the proviso at a different time (the death of
the donor). Applying the rule of construction that, in cases of
doubt, revenue statutes should be construed most favorably to
the taxpayer, it applied the 1924 rates to the property sought to
be taxed. Thus, according to the Court's interpretation of the
1936 statute, in the case of a resident donee dying at any time
after the effective date of the 1924 Act, the tax rates applied are
those in effect at the time of the death of the donor.
C. The 1942 Act
Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Company,"' although
interpreting the 1936 Act, was actually decided by the Court of
Appeals after the 1942 Act had been passed by the Kentucky
legislature. The Reeves court held the 1936 Act ambiguous and
noted that the legislature in 1942 also recognized the confusion
when it amended and re-enacted the 1936 Act in such a way to
include the same thought as if the words "created after the effec-
tive date of this act" had been inserted into the proviso of 1936.
The 1942 Act amended the 1936 Act by adding the following:
In the event this provision should operate to provide an
exemption for any beneficiary of a donee not authorized by
section 4281a-20 of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1936 Edition,
then this exemption shall be retrospectively disallowed. It is
further provided that the remainder interest passing under
the donee's power of appointment, whether exercised or
not, shall be added to and made a part of the distributable
share of the donee's estate for the purpose of determining the
exemption and rates applicable thereto.40
In Allen's Executor v. Howard,4' the Court discussed the
history of the powers of appointment statute, but concluded that
it was not concerned with KRS § 140.040 or its constitutionality,
either state or federal. The Court did, however, suggest that the
statute only applied to powers of appointment created by wills.
This alleged defect was remedied by the 1948 Act.
In Ream v. Department of Revenue, 2 the donor of a power of
39 Id. at 624.
40 Ky. Acs h. 204, § 1 (1942).
41200 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1947).
42236 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1951).
1973]
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appointment died a nonresident of Kentucky in 1924. The donee
died a Kentucky resident in 1946, having exercised the power in
favor of his wife. The Department apparently had never had a
case involving a nonresident donor and a resident donee. The
Department assessed the tax, using 1946 rates, against the net
value of the property passing to the appointee. The taxpayer
objected to the assessment on the grounds that it was not the
intent of the 1942 Act to levy an inheritance tax upon a transfer
of property outside the state under a nonresident testamentary
power of appointment and that the statute made the death of the
donor the only taxable event. The Court stated that under the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Graves v. Schmid-
lapp43 the state of the donee's residence could tax the exercise
of a power of appointment given under the will of a nonresident
donor. There remained, however, the question whether the 1942
Act expressly taxed such exercise at the time of the donee's death.
Again the Court found the wording of the statute in doubt and
resolved that doubt in favor of the taxpayer. It held that the
donee's life estate and the 1946 transfer of the remainder interest
to the appointee should be taxed at the time of the donor's death
in 1924 against the corpus44 of the donor's estate. Since Kentucky
had no jurisdictional power to tax the life interest of the donee in
1924, the 1924 value of that life interest should be deducted from
the 1924 gross estate, and the remainder taxed by Kentucky at
the rates prevailing in 1924.4 5
D. The 1948 Act-Our Present Statute
In order to clarify the powers of appointment statute and
43 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
44 BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 413 (4th ed. 1951) defines "corpus as "theprincipal sum or capital as distinguished from the interest or income." Although
this definition would apply to "corpus" as used in KRS § 140.040(2), the Depart-
ment construes "corpus' to refer, not only to the appointive property, but to the
entire taxable property in the decedent's estate.45 It appears that certain Reeves dicta and the Ream decision are incom-
patible. Reeves held that the 1936 Act was ambiguous because the first part of
e statute authorized taxation at the death of the donee and the second part (the
proviso added in 1936) at the death of the donor. The Court noted that the 1942Act made the 1936 proviso applicable only to powers of appointment created
after 1936. In a situation similar to Reeves but decided under the 1942 Act, theCourt of Appeals in Ream still found KRS § 140.040 ambiguous and proceeded to
apply the rates applicable at the death of the donor. This was done in spite of
the fact that the power was created long before 1936 and, under the Reeves
decision the 1936 proviso (taxing appointive property at the donor's death) did
not apply. Therefore, the property should have been taxable at the rates ap-
plicable at the donee's death.
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to remedy certain defects contained therein, the legislature in
194846 enacted the present language of KRS § 140.040. The 1948
Act corrected the defect noted in the Ream case where there was
a nonresident donor dying before 1936 and a resident donee dying
subsequently. When the controversy began with the death of
the donee in 1946, it was obvious that clarification of the law
was needed in order to spell out the legislative intent in this area.
This was accomplished by the 1948 Act which essentially pro-
vided that the tax on the remainder interest be levied at the death
of a resident donor dying after 1936, and in all other cases (non-
resident donor dying before or after 1936 and resident donor
dying before 1936), at the death of the resident donee.
In Allen's Executor the Court had stated its belief that KRS
§ 140.040 applied only to wills.4 7 In 1948, the Kentucky General
Assembly emphasized that the statute applied to the exercise of a
power of appointment not only by will but also by deed, trust
agreement, contract, insurance policy, or any other instrument.4 8
Besides clarification of the act, the Kentucky legislature had
to solve the following problem. Under the Ream decision in-
terpreting the 1942 Act, the transfer of any appointive property
40 Ky. AcTs ch. 96, § 8 (1948), codified as KRS § 140.040 (1948).
47 200 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1947).48 This does not necessarily mean that all appointive property is taxable at the
death of the donor. In order to be taxable under KRS § 140.040, it appears
necessary that the property be subject to estate or inheritance taxes under KRS
chapter 140. Transfers of property are taxable under KRS § 140.010 when made
by: (1) will, (2) intestate law, (3) grant or gift made in contemplation of death,
or (4) grant or gift made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death. The Court of Appeals further stated in Martin v. Storrs, 126 S.W.2d
445, 447 (Ky. 1939), that "an estate tax and an inheritance tax are grounded
upon: 1) The passage of title; 2) by reason of death; 3) from the decedent; 4) to
the beneficiary or beneficiaries." See also Gearharts Ex'r v. Howard, 196 S.W.2d
118 (Ky. 1946). If the funds are not taxable under KRS § 140.010 at the death
of the donor or donee, no tax may be levied merely because a power of appoint-
ment is involved. Thus, if a donor creates an irrevocable inter vivos trust, with a
power of appointment over the trust, the appointive property should not be taxable
at his death. Furthermore, it appears that the donee need not come into im-
mediate possession or enjoyment at the donor's death as long as the donor has
divested himself of all incidents of control or ownership. See Commonwealth v.
American Nat'l Bank, 425 S.W.2d 281 (Ky. 1968). The foregoing analysis can also be
applied to property which would ordinarily be tax-exempt, such as insurance
proceeds under KRS § 140.020. Countering the Department's argument that life
insurance proceeds subject to a power of appointment were liable for inheritance
tax at the donor's death, the Court of Appeals in Kentucky Trust Co. v. Department
of Revenue, 421 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1967), stated that a prerequisite to the taxation
of property under KRS § 140.040 was that the property itself be subject to tax.Since life insurance proceeds are tax-exempt, no inheritance tax could be levied
on these proceeds. The property may be taxable at the donee's death, however.
See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
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to a donee dying after 1936 was held to be a taxable transfer at
the time of the donor's death. If a donor creating a power of
appointment died before 1906 when there was no Kentucky in-
heritance tax, the appointive property would have escaped all
taxation.4 9 This was remedied by the 1948 statute where the
legislature made clear that the tax was to be levied at the death
of the resident donee unless the resident donor dies after 1936, in
which case the tax is levied at the donor's death.
III. TBE DPARTmT OF BEVENuE'S INT PETATiON
AND ADMuSTRATiON OF KRS § 140.040
A. KRS § 140.040
The present Kentucky powers of appointment statute, KRS §
140.040, classifies taxpayers (actually the beneficiaries, although
KRS § 140.220 requires the tax to be paid by the administrator or
executor of the decedents estate) into what are believed to be
two dissimilar classes. Into Class 1 are lumped those estates in
which the tax is collectible at the resident donor's death. This
first class is composed of beneficiaries who are deemed for tax
purposes to take at the death of a resident donor dying after
1936. This follows the common law rule5° but legal gymnastics
must be resorted to since KRS § 140.040 purports to tax the
exercise of the power which occurs at the donee's, not the donor's
death.5 Although KRS § 140.040(1) applies, the basic taxing
section is Subsection 2 of the statute.52 Class 2 includes those
estates in which the tax is collectible only at the resident donee's
death because the donor was a nonresident or a resident who
49 Estate of Flora M. Woolley, Order No. 390 (Ky. Tax Comm'n, 1944).
50 See Ream v. Dep't of Revenue, 236 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Ky. 1951).51 In Note, Kentucky Death Taxes-Putting a Price on Inheritance, 58 Ky. L.T.
549, 565 (1970), the author contends that KRS § 140.040 creates two taxable
events: (1) the creation of the power by the donor, and (2) the exercise, or non-
exercise, of the power by the donee. In theory, he is wrong; in actuality, he is
partly right. Realistically, Subsection 2 of KRS § 140.040 does tax the creation at
death of a power by a resident donor dying after 1936 while Subsection 3 taxes the
exercise of a power by a donee. It should be noted, however, that some donees
are not encompassed by Subsection 3 of KRS § 140.040. If a donor is embraced by
Subsection 2 his donee is also included in Subsection 2.
52 KRS § 140.040 expressly requires that Subsection 1 be construed with Sub-
section 2 and 3. Subsection 1 and Subsection 2 at first glance appear to be con-
tradictory. The net effect, however, is that the tax is to be collected at the donor's
death from the beneficiaries of any donors falling within Subsection 2. When Sub-
sections I and 3 are construed together, it is apparent that the tax is to be collected
at the death of the resident donee.
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died before the 1936 Act was passed. This second class is com-
posed of beneficiaries who take at the death of a resident donee
having a power of appointment created by (1) a nonresident
donor dying before 1986; (2) a nonresident donor dying after
1986,11 or (3) a resident donor dying before 1936.5' Subsection 1
and Subsection 3 form the basis of the tax levied on this class.a5
B. Examples of Taxation under KRS f' 140.040
The taxation of powers of appointment is extremely compli-
cated and it may take many years to master the fine points.
53 In a case now pending before the Court of Appeals, Kentucky Bd. of Tax
Appeals v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., File Nos. F-198-72, F-205-72 (Ky.,
filed Sept. 26, 1972) a taxpayer is contending that beneficiaries of nonresident
donors dying after 1936 are taxable under Subsection 2 of KRS § 140.040 and not
Subsection 3, as the Department of Revenue is arguing. Brief for Appellee at
10-11. The Department asserts that such inclusion would effectively allow bene-
ficiaries of these nonresident donors to escape all taxation on appointive roperty
contrary to KRS § 140.040(5), and that Subsection 2 by its terms can only applyto resident donors. Reply brief for Appellant at 5-8.
54 A fourth group would include those beneficiaries of resident donors dying
after 1936 on whose estates no tax was collected, e.g., situations where the ap-
pointive property was not taxable under KRS § 140.010 at the donor's death or
was tax-exempt. See note 48 supra.
55 As a general rule there may be discrimination based upon classification if
that classification is reasonable. See cases cited in MODERN FaDEAL PRAcTICE
DxEsT, CoNsTrrur oNAL LAW § 211(b) (1969, Supp. 1972). Kentucky obviously
treats beneficiaries taking appointive property from a resident donor dying after
1936 differently from beneficiaries taking appointive property from other donors.
The Department of Revenue believes this classication is reasonable and con-
stitutionally valid. First, Kentucky provides many benefits to residents of the
state, including resident donors. In return, Kentucky taxes the transfer of property
by a power of appointment created by resident donors. Before 1936, when the
tax was collected at the donee's death, many powers were conveyed to nonresident
donees and resident donees who subsequently moved out of Kentucky. As a result,
Kentucky lost much tax revenue. The 1936 law alleviated this problem. The
present statutory classification is the most practical method of collecting taxes
under KRS § 140.040 in order to insure that resident donors and donees give
something in return for the benefits Kentucky provides. Second, Massachusetts in
Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936), and New York in Whitney v. State Tax
Comm'n, 309 U.S. 530 (1940), had statutes similar to that of Kentucky. Neither
statute was held unconstitutional simply because it changed the incidence of the
tax to resident donors dying after the act was passed. In fact, the Supreme Court
in Binney ageed that a state, after adopting a certain taxing policy, was not
obligated to hold to that policy ad infinitum but could constitutionally change its
policy when a justifiable need to do so arose.
Third, the Court of Appeals has studied KRS § 140.040 or its predecessor
several times and has always held the powers of appointment statute to be con-
stitutional. Commonwealth v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 146 S.W.2d 3(Ky. 1940); Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 169 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1943;
Ream v. Dep't of Revenue, 236 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1951), quoting Graves v. Schmid-
lapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
Finally, a statutory classification subjecting classes to different treatment is
valid if such classification is reasonably related to the purpose of the statute.
The purpose of the inheritance tax law is to raise revenue. Kentucky Tax Comm'n
v. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., 245 S.W.2d 950 (Ky. 1952). Obviously, the pur-
pose of this classification is to produce revenue by making the collection of in-
heritance taxes more certain.
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Even the mechanics of levying and calculating the tax are dif-
ficult. The following examples illustrate how the Department of
Revenue actually taxes an estate when a power of appointment
is involved.5" Current life expectancy tables57 and percentage
rates of return58 are used. Note that Example 1 corresponds with
the first class of beneficiaries, whereas Examples 2 and 3 are both
in the second class of beneficiaries. The only difference between
Examples 2 and 3 is that the donor in Example 2 was a resident
of Kentucky at his death and the donee's life interest was probably
taxed then. The donee's life estate in Example 3 could not be
taxed in the donor's estate because he was a nonresident.
(1) Example 1: A resident donor and resident donee
both dying after 1986 (see sample forms).
John Smith died in 1960 with a net estate of $100,000. He gave
$50,000 to his wife Jane, age 60, for life with power of appoint-
ment over the remainder at her death. The residue of the estate
was to go to her for life with remainder to his nephew, Jack
Smith. At the present time Jane Smith is going to will the ap-
pointive property to her husband's nephew, Jack.59
In calculating each beneficiary's share of John Smith's estate,
the Kentucky Department of Revenue first looks at John's net
estate. The widow, Jane Smith, received two interests, a life
estate of $50,000 with a power of appointment over the remainder
and a life estate in the residue of John Smith's estate. The amount
of each life estate is figured separately and then the two amounts
are combined for the purposes of calculating the inheritance tax.
The Department first takes her $50,000 life estate with power of
appointment and multiplies this by 4%, the interest rate which
56 The objective of the Department of Revenue is to tax the full value of the
appointive property once as it passes from donor to donee to appointee. The
Department attempts to tax the value of the property at the donee's, rather than the
donor's, death because it is usually higher. Since beneficiaries of Class 2 are taxed
at the donee's death, there is no problem with this class. As for Class 1 beneficiaries,
aggregation of the appointive property with the donee's general estate property
results in a higher tax, thus off-setting the generally lower tax at the donors death.
57 See Life Expectancy Tables, 17 Ky. REv. STAT. 533-35 (1972).
58 KRS § 140.100.
59 The Department of Revenue, in assessing tax on the appointee's share of
the estate, must make an educated guess who the appointee(s) will be. This
estimate is usually based on the donee's present intentions and his will. See KRS §
140.110. The fact that the power of appointment is general makes no difference;
the Department still taxes the remainder interest on the basis of the probable
beneficiary.
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KRS § 140.100 provides she should get as a yearly return; the
result is multiplied by 11.5162 years, her life expectancy at age
60, which is obtained from KRS actuarial tables: ($50,000 x 4% x
11.5162). The value of her life estate in the appointive property
is thus determined to be $23,032.40. Her life estate in the residue
of John's estate is determined in the same way and is the same
amount. When these two amounts are added, her total share
of John Smith's estate is $46,064.80. Jane Smith's share then
receives an exemption of $10,0000 and the tax rates, as provided
by KRS § 140.070, are applied to the remaining $36,064.80.
Jack Smith, John Smith's nephew, has two interests in John's
estate. One interest is a remainder in the appointive property
and the other interest is a remainder in the residue. Note that
these two interests are not aggregated but are separated for the
purposes of determining the inheritance tax, because the residue
property Jack inherits as a nephew of John Smith is taxed at differ-
ent rates and exemptions than the appointive property he inherits
as a nephew-in-law (not actually a blood relation) of Jane Smith.
Although the appointive property is taxed against the corpus of
John Smith's estate, it actually passes under tax law from donee
Jane Smith and thus is subject to different rates and exemptions
because the degree of relationship is not the same between John
and Jack as it is between Jane and Jack."' Jack's remainder
interest is calculated by subtracting Jane's life estate from the
$50,000 subject to the power of appointment. Jack's interest in
the remainder of the appointive property is $26,967.60 ($50,000
less $23,032.40). His interest in the residue is derived the same
way. Jack receives a $500 exemption on his remainder interest in
the appointive property but he receives a $1,000 exemption on
his remainder interest in the residue. Jack receives a greater
exemption on his remainder interest in the residue because his
relationship to John is closer than his relationship to Jane. He is
deemed to receive the residue from John and the appointive re-
mainder interest from Jane.
Jane Smith died 10 years later at age 70, leaving her entire
estate to her nephew-in-law, Jack Smith. The power of appoint-
ment property is now worth $60,000, instead of the original
GOCKRS § 140.080(l)(a).61 See KRS §§ 140.070 and 140.080.
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$50,000, and the balance of her estate is worth $30,000. To arrive
at Jane Smith's net estate, the Department of Revenue subtracts
her remaining life estate from her appointive property ($60,000)
and then adds the value of her own estate ($30,000). The De-
partment calculates her life expectancy at age 70 at 7.9978 years.
She could have expected a yearly return of 4% interest. The De-
partment multiplies the value of the appointive property in which
Jane Smith had a life estate, $60,000 x 4% x 7.9978 years to arrive
at $19,194.72 which is subtracted from $60,000. The net value
of the appointive remainder interest in which Jane held a life
interest is thus $40,805.28. This amount, added to her other prop-
erty ($30,000), brings the total of her net estate to $70,805.28.
Value of appointive property $60,000.00
Less: life interest of Jane Smith at age 70
($60,000 x 4% x 7.9978 years) -19,194.72
Net value of appointive property $40,805.28
Add: value of Jane Smith's independent property +30,000.00
Net estate of Jane Smith $70,805.28
There is only one beneficiary, Jack Smith. The inheritance
tax due from Jack Smith is calculated first on Jane Smith's net
estate, which is an aggregation of her appointive property and
her other property. Then the tax on the power of appointment
property alone is calculated and this amount is subtracted from
the tax on the aggregated net estate. If there had been more than
one beneficiary, the calculation would have been the same except
that the net estate would have been divided into each beneficiary's
share and then the rates and exemptions would have been applied.
Each beneficiary's share would still have contained an aggregation
of the donee's appointive property and general estate property.
63A200 SAMPLE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY RESIDENT DONOR
4-67 Department of Revenue DYING AFTER 1936
Frankfort
40601
COMPUTATION OF INHERITANCE TAX
Estate of John Smith Code No. HR ........................
N et estate .................................................................................................. $100,000.00
Specific bequest ................................ $50,000.00
Life insurance payable to beneficiaries .............................. $ ...... $ ............
Residue ........................................................................................................ $ 50,000.00
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Jane Smith 60 widow
50,000.00 for life with Power
of Appointment
50,000.00 x 4% x 11.5162 =
23,032.40
life interest in residue
50,000.00 x 4% x 11.5162 =
23,082.40
Jack Smith
remainder Power of
Appointment
($50,000-$23,032.40)
Jack Smith nephew
remainder residue
($50,000-$23,032.40)
TOTAL
Balance Rate Tax
Share Exemption Taxable % $
$ 46,064.80 $10,000.00 $36,064.80
20,000.00 x 2% 400.00
10,000.00 x 3%
6,064.80 x 4%
26,967.60 500.00 26,467.60
10,000.00 x 6%
10,000.00 x 8%
6,467.60x10%
300.00
242.59
$ 942.59
600.00
800.00
646.76
$2,046.76
26,967.60 1,000.00 25,967.60
10,000.00 x 4% 400.00
10,000.00 x 5% 500.00
5,967.60 x 6% 358.06
$1,258.06
100,000.00 $4,247.41
63A-200 SAMPLE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY RESIDENT DONEE
Department of Revenue
Frankfort
40601
DYING AFTER 1936
COMPUTATION OF INHERITANCE TAX
Estate of Jane Smith Code No. HR ........................
Net estate .................................................................................................... $ 70,805.28
Specific bequests .................................................................... $ ...........
Life insurance payable to beneficiaries .............. $......$.............
Residue ...................................................................................................... $ 70,805.28
Jack Smith
net estate 70,805.28
Power of Appointment property
40,805.28
-500.00 exemption
40,305.28
10,000.00 x 6% = $ 600.00
10,000.00 x 8% = 800.00
10,000.00 x 10% = 1,000.00
10,305.28 x 12% - 1,236.63
Balance Rate Tax
Share Exemption Taxable % $
$70,805.28 $500.00 $70,305.28
10,000.00 x 6% 600.00
10,000.00 x 8% 800.00
10,000.00 x 10% 1,000.00
15,000.00 x 12% 1,800.00
15,000.00 x 14% 2,100.00
10,305.28 x 16% 1,648.84
$7,048.84
less tax on P. of A. Property -3,636.63
$3,636.63
$70,805.28
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(2) Example 2: A resident donor dying before 1986 and
a resident donee dying after 1926.
John Smith, a Kentucky resident, died in 1930, with a net
estate valued at $100,000. In his will he gave his wife Jane, age 30,
$50,000 for life with a power of appointment over the remainder
at her death. The residue of the estate, $50,000, goes to Jane for
life with the remainder passing to his nephew, Jack Smith, at her
death. Jane plans to will the appointive property to Jack when
she dies. Her life estate in the appointive property (using current
life expectancy tables and percentage rates of return) is $38,805.60
and her interest in the residue is another $38,805.60, both of
which are taxed at John's death, as is Jack's remainder interest in
the residue, $11,194.40. Jack's remainder interest in the appointive
property is not taxed.
Jane Smith dies in 1970 at age 70. The appointive property
is now worth $60,000 and her independent estate is valued at
$30,000. In arriving at Jane's net estate, the appointive property,
$60,000, is aggregated with the donee's independent property,
$30,000, for a total of $90,000. Her life estate at age 70 is not
subtracted in arriving at her net estate. The Department of
Revenue, after calculating the tax on the $90,000 net estate, does
not subtract the tax on the appointive property because the re-
mainder interest in the appointive property was not taxed in the
donor's estate. This results in a higher tax than if the appointive
property and the other property were separated, a tax calculated
on each, and both of these taxes added together.
(3) Example 8: A nonresident donor dying before or
after 1986 and a resident donee dying after 1986.
John Smith dies a resident of state X in 1930 with a net estate
of $100,000. In his will he gives his wife, Jane, age 30, $50,000
for life with a power of appointment over the remainder at her
death. The residue of the estate, $50,000, goes to Jane for life
with the remainder passing to his nephew, Jack Smith. Jane plans
to will the appointive property to Jack at her death. The chances
are good that state X taxed Jane's life estate in the appointive
property and the residue at John's death along with Jack's re-
mainder interest in the residue. If state X collects inheritance or
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estate tax at the death of the donor, it will also tax Jack's re-
mainder interest in the appointive property.
Jane and Jack subsequently become domiciled in Kentucky.
Upon Jane's death in 1970 at age 70, the appointive property is
worth $60,000 and her independent estate is valued at $30,000,
all of which she wills to Jack. Her net estate is $90,000 ($60,000 ±
$30,000). The entire amount is taxed. Her life estate is not sub-
tracted. The tax on the appointive property is not subtracted
from the tax on the aggregated estate of $90,000.62
(4) Summary
Under present law there are four possible combinations of
donors and resident donees subject to Kentucky inheritance taxes
on either the donor's or donee's death.
1. A resident donor dying after 1936 and a resident donee of
the power also dying after 1936.
(a) The tax at the donor's death on the appointive prop-
erty is levied on the life estate of the donee and on the re-
mainder interest which comes out of the corpus of the donor's
estate.
(b) At the death of the donee his life estate is deducted
in arriving at his net estate. The remainder interest is in-
cluded in the donee's general estate for rates and exemptions
only, and then the tax on the remainder interest in the ap-
pointive property is subtracted.
2. A resident donor dying before 1936 and a resident donee
dying after 1936.
(a) The life estate of the donee in the appointive property
is taxed at the donor's death; the remainder interest is not taxed
at that time.
(b) Upon the donee's death his life estate is not deducted
in determining his net estate. The entire value of the ap-
6 2 The Department has never had a situation where inheritance tax was
collected separately on both the donee's life estate and the appointee's remainder
interest at the death of the donor and the donee subsequently moves to Kentucky
and dies domiciled there. Can the appointive property be taxed again? See KRS
§ 140.040(5) and 140.275. But see Ream v. Dep't of Revenue, 236 S.W.2d 462
Ky. 1951), where Kentucky was allowed to collect inheritance taxes even though
the entire value of the donor's estate had been taxed in Connecticut at the donor's
death.
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pointive property is included in the donee's estate and the tax
on the remainder interest in the appointive property is not
subtracted.
3. A nonresident donor dying after 1936 and a resident
donee also dying after 1936.
(a) There is no Kentucky tax at the nonresident donor's
death.
(b) Upon the resident donee's death, his life estate is not
deducted in determining his net estate. The entire value of
the power of appointment property is included in the donee's
estate and the tax on the remainder interest in the appointive
property is not deducted.
4. A nonresident donor dying before 1936 and a resident
donee dying after 1936.
(a) There is no Kentucky tax at the nonresident donor's
death.
(b) Upon the resident donee's death, his life estate is not
deducted in determining his net estate. The entire amount
of the appointive property is included in the donee's estate
and the tax on the remainder interest in the appointive prop-
erty is not subsequently subtracted.
C. Departmental Interpretation of KRS f 140.040 on a line-by-
line Basis.
A discussion of all five sections of KRS § 140.040 and the De-
partment of Revenue's interpretation follows.
§ 140.040(1). Whenever any person shall exercise a power of
appointment derived from any disposition of property
(whether by will, deed, trust agreement, contract, insurance
policy or other instrument) regardless of when made, such
appointment shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the
provisions of this chapter in the same manner as though the
property to which such appointment relates belonged abso-
lutely to the donee of such power and had been bequeathed
or devised by such donee by will; and whenever any person
possessing such a power of appointment so derived shall omit
or fail to exercise the same in whole or in part, within the
time provided therefor, a transfer taxable under the provisions
of this chapter shall be deemed to take place to the person or
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persons receiving such property as a result of such omission or
failure to the same extent that such property would have been
subject to taxation if it had passed under the will of the donee
of such power. The time at which such transfer shall be
deemed to take place, for the purpose of taxation, shall be
governed by the provisions of subsections (2) to (4) of this
section.
This section provides that all exercises of powers of appoint-
ment are to be taxed as if the property belonged to the donee in
fee. 63 If a person holding a power of appointment fails to exercise
it, the property subject to the power is taxable as though it be-
longed to the donee and passed under his will. The time when
the taxable transfer of the appointive property from the donee
to the beneficiary is deemed to take place is to be determined by
subsections 2, 3, and possibly subsection 4.
§ 140.040(2). In the case of a power of appointment which
passes to the donee thereof at the death of the donor, under
any instrument, and if the donor dies on or after April 24,
1936, the transfer shall be deemed to take place, for the pur-
pose of taxation, at the time of the death of the donor and the
assessment be made at that time against the life interest of the
donee and the remainder against the corpus.
If the donor creating a power of appointment dies on or after
April 24, 1936, the taxable transfer takes place at his death. At
that time, the donee's life estate is taxed. The remainder interest
is taxed out of the corpus. Since only resident donors can be taxed
in Kentucky at death, the Department of Revenue construes
Subsection 2 as applying only to resident donors dying after April
24, 1986, the effective date of the Act.64 All other donors are
taxed under Subsection 3.
§ 140.040(2) (cont.) The value of the property to which the
power of appointment relates shall be determined as of the
date of the death of the donor and shall be taxed at the rates
and be subject to the exemptions in effect at the death of the
donor.
63 See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
4 See note 53 supra.
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The appointive property is to be valued on the date of the
donor's death for inheritance tax purposes and shall be taxed at
the tax rates then in effect. The amount of monetary exemption,
if any, to which the prospective appointee is entitled shall be the
exemption in effect at the donor's death.
§ 140.040(2) (cont.) The determination of the applicable
rates and exemptions (in effect at the death of the donor)
shall be governed by the relationship of the beneficiary to the
donee of the power of appointment.
This section in effect provides that KRS § 140.070 and KRS
§ 140.080 are to be applied in determining the tax. The governing
relationship in determining rates and exemptions is that of the
beneficiary to the donee, not donor.
§ 140.040(2) (cont.) In the event the payment of the tax at
the death of the donor should operate to provide an exemption
for any beneficiary of a donee not authorized by KRS §
140.080, then such exemption shall be retrospectively dis-
allowed at the time of the death of the donee.
This sentence was added to KRS § 140.040 in 1942 after the
Court of Appeals discovered an ambiguity in the 1936 Act. By
it the legislature made clear that after 1936 the tax was to be
levied at the donor's death at the rates and exemptions then in
effect.65
§ 140.040 (2) (cont.) It is further provided that the remainder
interest passing under the donees power of appointment,
whether exercised or not, shall be added to and made a
part of the distributable share of the donee's estate for the
65 See footnotes 86-40 supra and accompanying text.
This portion of the statute could also apply in situations involving exemptions
under the 1936 and 1942 Acts. Under KRS § 140.080, a person inheriting
property valued at less than a certain amount was entitled to a specific monetary
exemption. No exemption was allowed if the property received was valued greater
than a specified sum. For example, a wife got a monetary exemption of $10,000
if she received under $30,000. No exemption was granted if the property was
worth more than $40,000. The 1948 Act repealed this provision and granted an
exemption regardless of the value of the property received. However, if a donor
creating a power of appointment died between 1936 and 1948, the appointee-
beneficiary taxed at that time may have been given an exemption on his remainder
interest under KRS § 140.080. If the beneficiary subsequently inherits more
property than the Department expected and thus would not have been entitled
to any exemption under the 1936 or 1942 Acts, the Department will decrease or
disallow altogether the exemption at the donee's death.
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purpose of determining the exemption and rates applicable
thereto.
When a donee dies with a power of appointment created by a
resident donor dying after 1936 and the appointive property was
taxed in the donor's estate, said appointive property will be ag-
gregated with the donee's general estate property only for the
purpose of applying the rates and exemptions. Then the tax on
the appointive property alone is calculated and is subtracted
from the tax on the aggregated estate to arrive at the amount of
tax due.
§ 140.040(3). In all cases other than that described in sub-
section (2) the transfer shall be deemed to take place, for the
purpose of taxation, at the time of the death of the donee.
In all cases where tax is not levied under Subsection 2, i.e.,
all powers of appointment created by (1) a nonresident donor
dying before 1936; (2) a nonresident donor dying after 1936; or
(3) a resident donor dying before 1936, the taxable transfer takes
place and is taxed at the resident donee's death.66
§ 140.040(8) (cont) In such cases, the value of the property
to which the power of appointment relates shall be determined
as of the date of the death of the donee and shall be taxed at
the rates and be subject to the exemptions in effect at the
death of the donee. The determination of the applicable rates
and exemptions (in effect at the death of the donee) shall be
governed by the relationship of the beneficiary to the donee
of the power of appointment.
The tax rates are those in effect at the death of the donee; the
amount of monetary exemption is also determined at the donee's
death. K.RS § 140.070 and KRS § 140.080 are to be applied in
determining the amount of the tax.
§ 140.040(4). The provisions of subsection (2) shall not pre-
clude the taxation, at the death of the donee, of any transfer
made by means of a power of appointment if such transfer
was not in fact reported to or a tax assessed thereon by the
Department of Revenue within the period of limitation pre-
scribed by KRS § 140.160. If the transfer by the power of
66 See notes 53 and 54 supra.
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appointment is not so reported or a tax assessed thereon, the
period of limitation prescribed in KRS § 140.160 shall not
begin to run until the death of the donee of such power.
A beneficiary cannot escape payment of the tax simply by not
reporting the exercise of a power of appointment. If a taxable
transfer was not reported or no tax was assessed on it by the De-
partment of Revenue, then the 10-year statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the donee's death. Therefore, the Depart-
ment of Revenue can collect taxes under these two circumstances
from the donor's estate, if possible. If not, it can collect the tax
at the death of the donee and for up to ten years thereafter.
§ 140.040(5). The amendments to this section, adopted by the
1948 General Assembly, shall apply to all powers of appoint-
ment whether created before or after the effective date of
said amendments. It is the declared intention of the General
Assembly to impose a tax upon every transfer of property by
means of a power of appointment, regardless of when or how
created, and it is the declared intention of the General As-
sembly that the use of the power of appointment device shall
not permit the transfer of property, to which such a power
relates, to escape thereby the payment of state inheritance
taxes.
The Kentucky General Assembly makes it plain that all trans-
fers of property by means of a power of appointment regardless of
when or how created, are to be taxed.
67
CONCLUSION
Powers of appointment are becoming more popular as people
increasingly realize that their utilization can greatly minimize
Kentucky inheritance taxes. If property is subject to a power of
appointment at common law, that property is deemed to pass from
the donor to the beneficiary. Kentucky tax law recognizes this
6 7 In Kentucky Bd. of Tax Appeals v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., File
Nos. F-198-72 and F-205-72 (Ky., Filed Sept. 26, 1972), now pending before the
Court of Appeals, the taxpayer argued that it is significant that the Kentucky
legislature omitted the word "where' in Subsection 5 and merely said ".vhen or
how created." Brief of Appellee at 13-14. The Department asserted that the
most important part of the subsection is the declaration of legislative intent to
tax all powers of appointment.
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rule to the extent that the total value of the property subject to
the power is taxed only once as it passes from the donor through
the donee to the beneficiary. If the property is not subject to a
power of appointment, it will pass under common law, and Ken-
tucky tax law, from the decedent to his heir and will be taxed then
as well as when the heir dies. It can be easily seen that unless a
power of appointment is used, the property is taxed in each suc-
cessive estate.
Although the Department usually taxes the entire value of
the appointive property in either the donor's or donee's estate,
under certain circumstances part of the appointive property may
be taxed in both estates. If for some reason only the donee's life
estate was taxed at the donor's death, then the beneficiary's
remainder interest will be taxed at the donee's death in order to
tax the total value of the appointive property. Thus, the Depart-
ment still taxes the total value of appointive property only once
in two estates. The intent of the Department is to levy the tax
at the earliest possible time to make collection more certain and
to insure that persons receiving services and benefits as residents
of Kentucky, whether donor or donee, pay their fair share of the
financial burden the state incurs in providing these benefits and
services.
KRS § 140.040 has had a colorful history. It has always been
upheld constitutionally while often at the same time being
termed ambiguous. This has been followed by legislative at-
tempts at clarification. As now in force and administered by the
Department of Revenue, however, the statute appears to be
constitutional and workable. KRS § 140.040 now classifies tax-
payer-beneficiaries into two distinct classes. The class into which
a taxpayer-beneficiary is placed depends on (1) whether the
donor was a nonresident or resident at death and (2) whether
the donor died before or after 1936, the effective date of the act.
The first class is composed of taxpayer-beneficiaries in which the
tax is actually capable of being collected at the death of the donor.
This includes all taxpayer-beneficiaries who take from a resident
donor dying after 1986. Although appearing contradictory until
their legislative and judicial history is understood, Subsections 1
and 2 of KRS § 140.040 form the basis of the tax levied on the first
class. The second class is composed of all taxpayer-beneficiaries
19731
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not in the first class, which are those estates in which the tax is
only collectible at the resident donee's death because (1) the
donor was a nonresident at death; (2) the donor was a resident
who died before the 1936 Act was passed; or (3) for some other
reason no tax could be collected at the resident donor's death.
KRS §§ 140.040(1) and (3) form the basis of the tax levied upon
this class. Cognizance must also be taken of Subsection 5, which
contains the legislative declaration of intent to tax all powers of
appointment. While this section could conceivably be interpreted
to tax appointive property in each decedents estate, the Depart-
ment construes it as meaning that appointive property shall be
taxed only once in Kentucky. Once the property ceases to be
subject to the power, however, it can be taxed again.
